This paper was not originally intended for a public audience and is not meant as a final say on the issue. Rather, I'd like to start a conversation about kitniyot, sharing minhagim, and whether anyone can decide for anyone else whether quinoa and other new foods are kitniyot.
I am sharing additional material, including a chart I created of kitniyot information from various websites and publications as well as the translations I used for my paper.
I'd like to thank my husband, Rabbi Avraham Bronstein, and my teacher Susan Hollis for their input as I wrote the original paper. I'd also like to thank the various friends who have looked at it since: Yona Baer, Motti Schleider, Ben Franz, Avi Kessner, and Noah Roth.
Kitniyot
– A Minhag for the Ages?
Daniela
Weiss-Bronstein
July
1, 2009
The Jewish principle Minhag
k'Halakha Hu means that that one's customs take on the status of law (Tosafot,
Menahot 20B). Practically that means that a valid minhag can
determine actual practice, both in cases where Rabbinic authorities disagree
and for different communities. Minhag
does not have the power to override Biblical or Talmudic law, and any minhag
that involves violation of halakha is invalid and may not be upheld (Or
Zarua, 1:7). Additionally, there are differing opinions regarding the
validity of a minhag created by someone not well-educated in halakha
who settled upon the minhag through erroneous understanding of the laws
(Makom Shenahagu, 3; Bach, Yoreh Deah, 214; Bet Yosef,
Yoreh Deah, 214; Shach, 214:7).
A valid minhag that has been accepted by previous generations of
a family or community takes on this status of Minhag k'Halakha Hu for
future generations (Pesachim, 50).
As we will see, one of the defining characteristics of a minhag
versus an actual Biblical or Talmudic law is that there are no factual sources
for it. Instead, suppositions have been
put forward regarding both why the minhag started and its purpose or usefulness
to the community. This principle of minhag
is so powerful that it has enacted and upheld some of the hallmarks of modern
Orthodox Judaism, such as the kippah, monogamy, and the use of a bridal
veil during a wedding ceremony. While
wearing a kippah and using a bridal veil are universally accepted in
Judaism, we will see that monogamy is actually only a minhag for the Ashkenazi
community.
The kippah, also known as yarmulke,
koppel, or head-covering, is probably the most well-known custom
practiced by religious Jews today. The
kippah originated with the idea that a man should cover his head while praying
(Hilkhot Tefilah, 5:5). It is also
considered an act of Kiddush haShem, honoring God's name. The minhag can be traced to the following
statements regarding covering one's head, “Rabbi Honah ben Joshua never walked
4 cubits with his head uncovered. He explained “Because the Divine Presence is
over my head, (Kiddushin, 31:A)” and “Cover your head in order that the
fear of Heaven may be upon you (Shabbat, 156:B).” While tzitzit, ritual
fringes, are supposed to be a reminder of God and his commandments, one can envision
that having additional reminders to be pious and aware of God was a custom that
quickly spread to the nearly universal visual marker it is today of a religious
Jew. This minhag is valid in that
it's not based in a misunderstanding, the source for the custom is a Jewish
sage, and it does not interfere with halakha.
Monogamy is a more recent
custom. Jewish society and law allowed
for polygyny, as shown by the marriage of Jacob to multiple wives, the marriage
of Solomon to multiple wives, and a myriad of other sources. After the return from the Babylonian Exile,
monogamy became the standard for practical reasons such as affordability and
avoiding strife in the marriage and home.
By the Middle Ages monogamy was still allowed but not often
practiced. This was formalized with the
enactment (takana) of Rabbi Gershom in the early 11th
century, forbidding polygyny for Ashkenazim. In Sephardic and Arabic Jewish
communities, the monogamy enactment is not valid, but it is still general
practice. The takana was
proclaimed for 1000 years and recently expired, but is still held to. This is a special case, where a takana
has now become minhag, but minhag that is considered halakha
in most cases. This minhag is valid
because polygyny is allowed, but not required, it was enacted by a great
scholar, and is not based on erroneous interpretations of halakha.
The bridal veil is a custom with
Biblical reference, but is not cited as law.
When Rebecca saw her groom, Isaac, approaching, she used her veil to
cover herself. This action has taken on
symbolism of Jewish modesty. The bride
herself is said to be moving into a realm of greater modesty, as expressed
through covering her hair after marriage.
She is also covering her face to hide from licentious thoughts of those
witnessing the ceremony. The groom is
supposed to use this opportunity to focus on his love for the bride's character
rather than her beauty. The veiling of
the bride is a central part of the wedding ceremony, as the groom comes forward
to see his bride for the first time, and lowers the veil before all the
attendees of the wedding. Many Sephardim
and Hassidim take this minhag very seriously and use an extremely
thick and opaque cloth to cover the bride's face. This minhag is valid because it is not
based in error (indeed, it is rooted in Hebraic custom), and it does not
interfere with halakha.
Validity and non-interference with halakha
are the two underlying necessities for a minhag to be upheld. Each of the previously referenced minhagim
works in concert with, or in addition to, the principles of halakha. None of them override halakha, and
none of them are erroneous interpretations or protections of halakha. Some, such as the kippah and the
bridal veil are practiced universally in Jewish circles (sects that do not wear
kippot regularly do still wear them for prayer service), and while
monogamy is not forced upon the Sephardic community, there are no
mainstream Rabbis who would allow polygynous marriage today.
To fully understand the argument
regarding Kitniyot, we must delve briefly into the history of Chametz
and Matzah. The Biblical sources
for chametz and matzah are as follows:
Seven
days you shall eat unleavened bread; on the very first day you shall remove
leaven from your houses, for whoever eats leavened bread from the first day to
the seventh day, that person shall be cut off from Israel (Exodus, 12:15).
In the
first month, from the fourteenth day of the month at evening, you shall eat
unleavened bread until the twenty-first day of the month at evening. No leaven shall be found in your houses for
seven days. For whoever eats what is
leavened, that person shall be cut off from the community of Israel, whether he
is a stranger or a citizen of the country.
You shall eat nothing leavened; in all your settlements you shall eat
unleavened food (Exodus, 12:18-20).
Throughout
the seven days unleavened bread shall be eaten; no leavened bread shall be
found with you, and no leaven shall be found in all your territory (Exodus,
13:7).
Exodus
12:15 tells us that we must eat matzah on Passover. Exodus 12:19 tells us that we may not have chametz
in our homes or for consumption. Exodus
13:7 further tells us that we may not have chametz within our property.
The
Rabbis extrapolate law from the verses, looking at where words repeat, how
phrases are put together, and which clauses about each other. Through these and
other methods, the basic laws of Passover are fleshed out. We will focus for the moment on Tractate Pesachim,
page 35:A.
Mishnah: There is a Biblical requirement to eat matzah
on the first night of Pesach (derived from Exodus 12:18, “In the first month,
from the fourteenth day of the month at evening, you shall eat unleavened bread”). The Mishnah defines what type of matzah must be eaten to
fulfill this obligation:
These are the species of grain with which a person fulfills
his obligation to eat matzah on the first night of Pesach: He fulfills the
obligation with wheat, barley, spelt, rye, and oats.
We have
now identified the five grains that can make valid matzah, through which
one may fulfill the Biblical obligation to eat matzah on the first night
of Pesach. This of course leaves
open the possibility of making matzah from other substances, which would not
fulfill the obligation of the first night.
The Mishnah stated that one fulfills his obligation on the
first night of Pesach only with matzah made of one of the above five
grains. The Gemara now seeks the
Scriptural source for this:
From the Mishnah we see that the flour of these five grains
indeed produces valid matzah (this phrase will denote matzah with which one may fulfill
their obligation on the first night of Pesach),
whereas flour made from other grains, such as rice or millet (this is the translation
of Aruch HaShulchan, Orach Chaim 208:21. Rashi renders millet as buckwheat), does not. From where is this derived?
The Gemara replies:
R' Shimon ben Lakish said, and so it was taught in the
academy of R' Yishmael, and so it was taught in the academy of R' Eliezer ben
Yaakov: The verse states (Deuteronomy 16:3): You shall
not eat chametz with it (the pesach offering); for seven days you shall eat
matzos with it. Now, from the juxtaposition of the command to eat matzos with
the prohibition against eating chametz, we derive that it is only with things
that come to leaven when left to rise that a person fulfills his obligation to
eat matzah (i.e.
only a dough having the potential to leaven qualifies as valid matzah when
baked before it leavens). Excluded from this
category, then, are these types of flours [i.e. rice flour and millet flour],
which do not come to leaven, but, on the contrary, come to spoil (i.e. although these
doughs may appear to rise when left to sit for a time, this phenomenon is not
due to a process of leavening but to a process of spoilage).
It would
then seem, from this passage, that one could make matzah from these
other substances on Pesach and consume them, but may not use them as
valid matzah for the fulfillment of the first night obligation.
R' Shimon ben Lakish further notes that the Mishnah's
teaching in this regard is disputed by at least one Tanna:
Our Mishnah, which by implication disqualifies rice of
millet flour as sources for valid matzah, does not reflect the view of R'
Yochanan ben Nuri, who said that rice is a species of grain, and that one
liable kares for consuming its leavened form on Pesach (R' Yochanan would
evidently sanction the eating of matzah made from rice or millet on the first night
of Pesach, since, in his view, even those flours have the capacity to leaven).
R'
Yochanan is the only sage to implicate rice as a grain that could create a
valid matzah. Since any grain
that can make valid matzah is also capable of becoming chametz,
R' Yochanan is saying here that rice products have the ability to become chametz,
and therefore need to be treated with the same care as grain products on
Passover.
A Baraisa confirms the assertion that R' Yochanan ben Nuri
indeed considers rice and millet subject to leavening:
For it was taught in a Baraisa: R' YOCHANAN BEN NURI
FORBIDS one to eat a dish cooked WITH RICE OR MILLET during Pesach, BECAUSE such
grains are CLOSE
TO LEAVENING (i.e. the leaven quickly).
On
Passover, we don't cook any of the five grains unless they are in a form in
which they will not come to leaven. This
means that one would not take a wheatberry, for example, and boil it on
Passover. So too, R' Yochanan rules that
one may not boil rice as it would be chametz.
R' Shimon ben Lakish appears to understand R' Yochanan ben
Nuri as saying that rice and millet “leaven quickly.” Other Amoraim, however,
question whether this is really the meaning of his words:
They inquire: when R' Yochanan ben Nuri states that these
grains are CLOSE
TO LEAVENING, what does he mean? That they
leaven quickly, or, perhaps, he means that they come “close to leavening,” but
do not ever become fully leavened (If R' Yochanan ben Nuri means that rice and
millet leaven quickly, there is every reason to assume that these grains can
achieve the same level of chametz classification as do the other five grains.
If so, one who eats a rice or millet product that has been left to rise would
be liable to kares if he did so deliberately or a chatas if he did so inadvertently;
and one would be able to fulfill his obligation to eat matzah with matzah made
from grains. If, however, he means that
these grains do not leaven as completely as do the other five grains, it would
follow that the consumption of rice or millet products that have risen does not
carry the kares penalty). -?-
Part of
the debate occurring here is a debate over whether rice and millet leaven, or
spoil, if left to rise. While dough goes
from flour to bread to sourbread to being able to work as a leavening agent,
most authorities agree that anything other than the five grains listed in the
Talmud cannot leaven.
The Gemara decides the question:
Come, learn a proof that he means “they leaven quickly”.
For it was taught in a Baraisa: R' Yochanan ben Nuri said: RICE IS A SPECIES OF
GRAIN, AND ONE IS LIABLE TO KARES FOR
consuming ITS
LEAVENED FORM, AND ONE FULFILLS HIS OBLIGATION ON PESACH BY eating matzah made from IT. AND LIKEWISE, R' YOCHANAN BEN NURI
SAID: KERAMIS IS SUBJECT TO THE CHALLAH TITHE, for it, too, is a kind of grain valid for use as flour in
matzah.
The Gemara inquires:
What is keramis? Abaye said: It is shitzanisa.
And what is shitzanisa? Rav Pappa said: Shitzanisa is that which
is found growing among poppy (Rashi renders shitzanisa as nigella, or the
fennel flower. The seeds of this plant,
which can be ground into flour, are black in color but otherwise bear some
resemblance to millet. There are other
explanations of shitzanisa. Aruch
seems to explain it as a plant whose seeds resemble cumin, while others
classify it as a caraway seed). At any rate, it is evident that according to
R' Yochanan ben Nuri, dough made from rice or millet leavens completely (As a practical matter,
the halakha does not follow R' Yochanan ben Nuri. Although some commentators
consider that rice may give rise to chametz noksheh [7:A, note 4], most
accord with the view of Rambam [Chametz and Matzah 5:1] who
states that rice products are completely permitted for consumption on Pesach,
for they cannot become chametz at all.
In keeping with this view, rice is indeed used on Pesach among
Sepharadim. Ashkenazim, however,
although subscribing to Rambam's view in principle, nevertheless avoid
the use of rice products because of their similarity in appearance to wheat
products [see Ritva and Chayei Adam 127:1, for other reasons see Meiri,
Maharam Chalavah, and Mishnah Berurah 453:6]).
R'
Yochanan's position is rejected, and this is the last that the Talmud
has to say about small grains that could be like chametz.
Before we
look at the beginnings of Kitniyot in Rabbinic literature, an
explanation of what Kitniyot actually is is in order. The Passover-bound minhag of
refraining from eating Kitniyot or things derived from Kitniyot
is a custom found in the Ashkenazi community.
Kitniyot are, loosely, items that do not leaven but may somehow
be confused with items that do leaven.
The first
source to comment on the minhag of Kitniyot is the Tor. He says:
These are the items through which you fulfill the
obligation of Matzah: wheat, barley, spelt, oats, and rye. But not with
rice and the other species – and they also do not become leavened (chametz),
and you can use them as ingredients. And so it is with every species of Kitniyot.
And there are those who forbid the eating of rice and all
species of Kitniyot as ingredients because bits of wheat could be mixed
in with them – it is an extra stringency/restriction, and it was not followed
(Siman 453).
The Orach Hayyim is a section of the Arba'ah Turim,
the model for the Shulchan Aruch, written by Rabbi Jacob ben Asher. His father, Rabbi Asher ben Yechiel, also
known as the Rosh, was the head Rabbi of Worms, a major Jewish center in
Germany, and then in France and Toledo, Spain, where he was once again
appointed the chief Rabbi. To see that
one of the major Ashkenazi Rabbis of the time felt that Kitniyot was an
extra restriction points to the fact that Kitniyot was not yet a
full-fledged minhag, nor was it being put forward as one to be adopted.
Rabbi Yosef Caro, the major codifier of Sephardic law,
comments on Kitniyot in his follow-up to the Orach Hayyim, Bet
Yosef Orach Hayyim:
“And there are those who forbid the eating of rice, etc”
Rabbi Yeruchum wrote that those whose practice it was not to eat rice and
species of Kitniyot on Pesach, it is nonsense – unless they are
doing it to be stringent, and I don't know why.
Because Rabbi Yosef Caro was a codifier of Sephardic law,
Sepharadi communities do not follow the Kitniyot stringency. Let's compare this opinion to that of a more
modern Rabbinic authority, this time an Ashkenazi Rabbi from Amsterdam, Rabbi
Yaakov Emden (Mor u'Ketziya l'Yaabetz, Siman 453):
And in a time of emergency of course you would permit all Kitniyot...
even the Baal HaTurim, who was Ashkenazi – this tradition had started
when he was alive – he didn't follow it, and wrote “it's an extra
stringency/restriction and it was not followed” - clearly the Ashkenazi Rabbis
of his day did not accept this practice... and how many decisors think it is
nonsense and a mistaken tradition for an object that doesn't require Charata
vHatara, regret and a nullification of vow (which is to say, there is no
halakhic repercussion for the eating of Kitniyot on Pesach).
Note the specific points made here. Rabbi Yaakov Emden is making the point that
this custom was based in error, was not adopted by the learned people of the
time, and is an invalid minhag.
And from what I saw with my father (Rabbi Tzvi Hirsch),
blessed be his memory, how much they troubled him; every Feast of the Matzahs
he would thunder and say “What disgraceful and wasteful legal attestation is
there for this terrible tradition that creates a stringency from a leniency?
It's an injurious confusion of ideas and is a hindrance on the prohibition of
actual chametz! Because when you don't have Kitniyot to eat and get
satisfied from, you must bake an excessive amount of Matzah, which all
has to be visually examined (for leavening). If you have a large household you
need make enough to feed and satisfy them all – so they are not as careful with
the dough as you should and must be. They make a lot at once, and they
equivocate – they come close to stumbling into a prohibition that carries the
penalty of Karet, being cut out of the nation of Israel, God forbid.
The most damning aspect of this responsa is that fact that
Rabbi Tzvi Hirsch found that following this minhag interferes with one's
ability to follow the halakha of chametz and matzah. Between the need for more matzah, with
the need for constant checking, and the inability to sate the family with
cheaper and more easily afforded foods, Rabi Tzvi feared that the focus on Kitniyot
could bring people to eat actual chametz.
Also, the Matzah is expensive and not everyone can
make enough. Kitniyot can be found for cheap, without working hard, and
are halakhically permissible. And you lose some of the joy of the festival for
a stringency that has no basis.
So I say, of course, whoever nullifies this tradition of
refusing to eat Kitniyot (and other similar terrible traditions), I will
be on his side – and all my life I will stand firm and look forward to the day
when someone will come to my side, and I will publicize God's knowledge (this
gospel truth, as it were) to release these dangerous stringencies that the
majority of the community cannot abide by.
Rabbi Yaakov Emden lived in the 18th century,
and was the son of the Chacham Tzvi, Rabbi Tzvi Hirsch ben Yaakov
Ashkenazi. Rabbi Tzvi Hirsch was the
chief Rabbi of Amsterdam, and wielded influence in large Ashkenazi communities
such as England.
For a more modern American responsa, we will turn to Rav
Moshe Feinstein. Rav Moshe is generally
considered to have been the chief halakhic decisor for American Jewry
from the 1950s through the 1980s. He was
born in Russia, and was educated there.
He was the president of the Union of Orthodox Rabbis of the United
States and Canada, which was affiliated closely with the Orthodox Union, the
largest Kosher certifying agency in the world.
He also chaired the Rabbinic policy-making council in America for the
AIA, Agudath Israel of America, the Haredi Jewish communal
organization. Rav Moshe published his responsa
in a set called Igrot Moshe. We
will look at his response to a question about whether peanuts should be added
to the list of Kitniyot items.
Igrot Moshe, Orach Hayyim, 3:63
Regarding Peanuts: Whether there is a concern of Kitnit
24 Adar 5726
In response to my friend Rabbi Yakov Goldman
Regarding peanuts, as I've written previously they were
consumed in many places during Pesach. The [author of the] Terumat haDeshen
wondered about this issue, as he heard that peanuts are sometimes ground into a
flour, and he also heard that they're grown in fields [near species of grain]
like other Kitniyot. But the Terumat haDeshen knew that it wasn't a matter
of principle that any food item that can be ground to flour is Kitniyot. There is no non-grain used to make flour as
often as the potato, not just in this country but in Europe as well, in current
times and in previous generations, and they never thought to forbid it for
Pesach consumption. And so too, the reasoning that different types of grain may
have mixed in with it, the reason suggested by the Tur, is not applied
universally as a matter of principle. We know that not all species that could
have wheat and barley mixed in with them are forbidden, as proven by our eating
anise and kimmel. Wheat and barley mix in with them, and the Taz
mentions that it is difficult to check. Nonetheless, they were never
prohibited, as is explicitly clear from the Rama. Additionally, the Rama forbids mustard
as Kitniyot even though it doesn't qualify for either of these two reasons.
Therefore we only include in this list items that are known far and wide to be
forbidden as Kitniyot. We try to create reasons to explain why things were
forbidden, but this category wasn't decided by a council of Rabbis – rather
they separately advised their communities to be strict, not to eat those
species that were fit to eat because of the possibility that grains could be
mixed in and hard to check, and because they could be made into flour. However, since they did not decree in council
to not eat things that could have grains mixed in and the foods that could be
made into flour, and rather there was a custom not to eat some species, only
those specific species are forbidden. They only forbade the species that they
were accustomed to, and not the rest of the species that they were not
accustomed to, because they were not known then. Or else potatoes, which were
not known then, and there was no custom to forbid them, they do not carry the
forbidden status of the species that were customarily forbidden, even though
the same criteria applies to them. Even though the same reason applies, we do
not expand from a custom of forbidding to include something that we did not
have the custom of forbidding. And as potatoes became common in Jewish
communities, the Rabbis did not want to forbid it because it was so necessary,
and also because the reasons themselves are somewhat weak. You can see where Bet Yosef cites RI
who called this a foolish custom. It's also known that Rabbi Yechiel and many
other great ones did permit them, even in places where the custom was to forbid
them, because he [Bet Yosef] writes that it is difficult to allow this
because others practiced a custom of forbidding it. Therefore the later Rabbis
did not want to continue to forbid items that were added later, although it
remains impossible to permit what was already forbidden. And so anise and
kimmel, it's possible that they weren't originally grown in an area where they
grew species of grain, so there was no reason to enact a prohibition. And
therefore even after they began to grow them near species of grain, they needed
to be checked, but were not forbidden. And therefore the peanut [which is not a
grain at all] was, all the more so, not forbidden in many places. And anywhere that there isn't a custom, you
should not forbid, because with these things you should not be stringent. And
anyone who has the specific custom not to eat peanuts, it's forbidden, but if
there's a doubt, do not forbid it. And so it is fitting that a
peanut-containing food can be certified kosher in that it doesn’t have any
chametz mixed in with it, and anyone who didn't have the custom that it was
forbidden should eat it. And so I've seen that they give kosher certification
to peanut oil for this reason.
Rav Moshe
makes a few points here. One point is
that because Kitniyot is a minhag, we retroactively are trying to
define how different items came to be labeled Kitniyot. He provides two main reasons – you can grind
the foods into a flour, or they are grown near fields of grain. Yet he says that there are items that are on
the list which meet neither of these criteria, and some items that are universally
accepted that meet both criteria. This
responsa is generally understood as Rav Moshe's determining that the list of Kitniyot
items must be closed, for reasons similar to those expressed by Rav Tzvi Hirsch
– the community must be left with what to eat on Pesach! He explicitly states that if we were to add anything
to the list of prohibited Kitniyot foods, we would need to add
potatoes. As any shopper in the store
during Passover can attest to, potatoes are a staple of Passover food. Some families even use them during the seder.
To
conclude, the most damning evidence to me is the fact that in my research I
could not find a validating source from the time the custom first arose. In fact the first sources to comment on the minhag
were very clear in their condemnation of the practice. Later sources can be found which try to
substantiate the premise of the minhag. These sources take 2 tacks:
post-created rules, which upon scrutiny do not apply to all products (both on
and off the list of prohibited foods), and the halakhic idea that we
continue to do what our ancestors have done.
Based on my understanding of the requirements for a valid minhag,
Kitniyot does not seem to be a minhag that should be followed or
allowed to evolve because it is unsubstantiated as a true minhag. However, I do not envision that Kitniyot
observance will be abolished in a wide-spread manner, although it will be
interesting to see what people who move to Israel choose to do in the coming
years given the responsa on the matter.
Works Cited:
Babylonian
Talmud, Masechta Menachot
Babylonian
Talmud, Masechta Pesachim
Babylonian
Talmud, Masechta Shabbat
Babylonian
Talmud, Masechta Kiddushin
Or Zarua
Makom
Shenahagu
Yoreh
Deah
Shach
Mishnah
Torah, Ahavah, Hilkhot Tefilah
Tor Orach
Hayyim
Translation
and Explanation of terms:
Minhag – custom; root word N.H.G., related to ways of conducting
oneself
Halakha – Biblical- or Talmudic-sourced law; root word H.L.KH.,
related to path or way
Chametz – leavened foods forbidden on Passover; literal chametz
is leavened foods made of one of the five grains that can make Matzah
Matzah – unleavened bread made from one of the five grains that
can become chametz if leavened
The five
grains – Chita, Seora, Kusemes, Shipun, Shibboles
Shual; wheat, barley, spelt, rye, oats
Kitniyot – literally small things; general term for foods that do
not become Chametz but are forbidden to consume on Passover in the
larger Ashkenazic community
Ashkenaz – literally Germany; general term for Jewish communities
from Central Europe, more specifically the communities that follow the psak
of the Rema in the Shulchan Aruch.
Psak – Halakhic decision
Shulchan
Aruch – literally prepared table; Coda of
Jewish law, written for Sephardi law by Rabbi Yosef Caro in the 16th
century
Bet
Yosef – both the name of Rabbi Yosef
Caro's first work and the name by which he is referred to
Rema – Rabbi Moshe Isserles, author of the Mappah, a
commentary on the Shulchan Aruch written to give a definitive listing of
Ashkenazi law. This commentary
is so thoroughly accepted by the Ashkenazi community that when they
refer to the Shulchan Aruch they not only include the Rema, but
hold it to be the greater authority.
Sepharad – literally Spain; general term for Jewish communities
from Spain, Portugal, and the Middle East (the Arabic communities are also
called Edot haMizrach, the Eastern communities); these communities
follow the psak of Rabbi Yosef Caro.
Yoreh
Deah – section of the Arba'ah Turim (written
by Rabbi Jacob ben Asher), which was the model for Caro's Shulchan Aruch. Because this section is the most
wide-ranging, it is the section studied for basic Rabbinic ordination.
Or
Zaruah – written in the 13th
century by Rabbi Isaac ben Moses of Vienna (Riaz). The Or Zaruah follows the arrangements
of the Talmudic tractates and functions as both commentary and ritual
coda.
Mishneh Torah – written by
Maimonides in the 12th century, the Mishneh Torah compiles
all Jewish law. Both Arba'ah Turim
and the Shulchan Aruch quote from the Mishneh Torah, and
Sephardic communities follow the rulings of Maimonides more closely than do
Ashkenazic.
Mishnah – the first major
written work of Rabbinic Judaism, redacted by Yehudah haNasi, collecting the
existing tradition of Jewish law. It
lists the debates of the Tanaim between 70 and 200 CE.
Gemara – Rabbinic (Amoraim)
commentaries on the Mishnah; there are two versions. The Jerusalem Talmud is a collection
of the Mishnah with the Gemara of Israel's scholars, completed
between 350 and 400 CE. The Babylonian Talmud
is a collection of the Mishnah with the Gemara of the scholars of
Babylonia, completed around 500 CE. The
Babylonian Talmud is generally held to be the greater authority due to
the greater stability of Jewish life outside of Israel.
Baraisa – Baraisas
are traditions in Oral law not included in the Mishnah. A Baraisa can bring greater
understanding of a Mishnah, but is generally less authoritative than the
Mishnah.
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